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Liz TomandCopilot App
b6da04c241
An on-call error-triage canvas for GitHub Copilot: scans live Sentry issues, groups them by urgency, and hands issues off for tracking or a fix PR. Registers a reusable canvas extension under extensions/ with a matching plugins/sentry-triage manifest. The extension runs a loopback HTTP/SSE server per canvas instance (host-allow-listed, per-instance capability token never broadcast over SSE), renders the triage board server- and client-side, and drives model turns over a single shared Copilot session serialized so scan and work turns can't interleave. Work state is prototype-pollution-guarded against agent-controlled tracking keys, and sendAndWait timeouts are handled without duplicating external side effects. Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
71 lines
2.5 KiB
JavaScript
71 lines
2.5 KiB
JavaScript
// Shared HTML-escaping helpers. All Sentry / MCP / agent-derived values are
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// interpolated into HTML string templates, so every dynamic text or attribute
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// value MUST pass through here before it reaches the webview.
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const HTML_ENTITIES = {
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'&': '&',
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'<': '<',
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'>': '>',
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'"': '"',
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"'": ''',
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}
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/** Escape a value for use as HTML text or a double/single-quoted attribute. */
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export function escapeHtml(value) {
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if (value == null) return ''
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return String(value).replace(/[&<>"']/g, (ch) => HTML_ENTITIES[ch])
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}
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/**
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* Return a safe href: only http(s) URLs are allowed through, everything else
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* (javascript:, data:, malformed, etc.) collapses to '#'. The result is still
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* attribute-escaped for embedding.
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*/
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export function safeHref(value) {
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if (value == null) return '#'
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const raw = String(value).trim()
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try {
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const url = new URL(raw)
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if (url.protocol === 'http:' || url.protocol === 'https:') {
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return escapeHtml(url.href)
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}
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} catch {
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// not an absolute URL — fall through
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}
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return '#'
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}
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/**
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* Serialize a value as JSON safe to embed inside an inline <script> block.
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* Escapes the characters that can terminate the script element or break the
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* JS string context (`<`, `>`, U+2028, U+2029).
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*/
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export function jsonForScript(value) {
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return JSON.stringify(value)
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.replace(/</g, '\\u003c')
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.replace(/>/g, '\\u003e')
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.replace(/\u2028/g, '\\u2028')
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.replace(/\u2029/g, '\\u2029')
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}
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/**
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* Neutralize a piece of untrusted, Sentry-derived text before it is embedded in
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* an agent prompt that can create issues / spawn code-writing sessions. A
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* crafted Sentry title or message is prompt-injection input, so we:
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* - collapse newlines and control characters to spaces, so it cannot introduce
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* its own instruction lines, fenced blocks, or fake tool directives;
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* - strip Markdown/emphasis and backtick fences that could restructure the
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* prompt;
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* - cap the length so a huge payload can't bury the real instructions.
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* This is defense-in-depth on top of treating the values as labeled data — not a
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* substitute for keeping untrusted content out of executable instructions.
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*/
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export function sanitizeForPrompt(value, maxLen = 300) {
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let text = value == null ? '' : String(value)
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text = text.replace(/[\u0000-\u001f\u007f\u2028\u2029]+/g, ' ')
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text = text.replace(/[`]+/g, "'")
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text = text.replace(/\s+/g, ' ').trim()
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if (text.length > maxLen) text = text.slice(0, maxLen - 1).trimEnd() + '…'
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return text
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}
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