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fix: pin GitHub Actions to immutable SHA hashes to prevent supply chain attacks (#1088)

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* chore: publish from staged

* fix: pin GitHub Actions to immutable SHA hashes to prevent supply chain attacks

Co-authored-by: simonkurtz-MSFT <84809797+simonkurtz-MSFT@users.noreply.github.com>

* chore: publish from staged

* Clean plugins

* Clean plugins

* Clean plugins

* Fix gem-team plugin

* Reset README.plugins.md

---------

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Simon Kurtz
2026-03-22 18:37:40 -05:00
committed by GitHub
parent 10e717202f
commit 919fdb3f8e
13 changed files with 52 additions and 50 deletions
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14
agents/github-actions-expert.agent.md
View File

@@ -41,10 +41,12 @@ Before creating or modifying workflows:
- Grant minimal necessary permissions
**Action Pinning**:
- Pin to specific versions for stability
- Use major version tags (`@v4`) for balance of security and maintenance
- Consider full commit SHA for maximum security (requires more maintenance)
- Never use `@main` or `@latest`
- Always pin actions to a full-length commit SHA for maximum security and immutability (e.g., `actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4.3.1`)
- **Never use mutable references** such as `@main`, `@latest`, or major version tags (e.g., `@v4`) — tags can be silently moved by a repository owner or attacker to point to a malicious commit, enabling supply chain attacks that execute arbitrary code in your CI/CD pipeline
- A commit SHA is immutable: once set, it cannot be changed or redirected, providing a cryptographic guarantee about exactly what code will run
- Add a version comment (e.g., `# v4.3.1`) next to the SHA so humans can quickly understand what version is pinned
- This applies to **all** actions, including first-party (`actions/`) and especially third-party actions where you have no control over tag mutations
- Use `dependabot` or Renovate to automate SHA updates when new action versions are released
**Secrets**:
- Access via environment variables only
@@ -89,7 +91,7 @@ Eliminate long-lived credentials:
## Workflow Security Checklist
- [ ] Actions pinned to specific versions
- [ ] Actions pinned to full commit SHAs with version comments (e.g., `uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4.3.1`)
- [ ] Permissions: least privilege (default `contents: read`)
- [ ] Secrets via environment variables only
- [ ] OIDC for cloud authentication
@@ -107,7 +109,7 @@ Eliminate long-lived credentials:
## Best Practices Summary
1. Pin actions to specific versions
1. Pin actions to full commit SHAs with version comments (e.g., `@<sha> # vX.Y.Z`) — never use mutable tags or branches
2. Use least privilege permissions
3. Never log secrets
4. Prefer OIDC for cloud access

6
agents/se-gitops-ci-specialist.agent.md
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@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ Build reliable CI/CD pipelines, debug deployment failures quickly, and ensure ev
18.16.0
# CI config (.github/workflows/deploy.yml)
- uses: actions/setup-node@v3
- uses: actions/setup-node@3235b876344d2a9aa001b8d1453c930bba69e610 # v3.9.1
with:
node-version-file: '.node-version'
```
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ main:
run: npm audit --audit-level=high
- name: Secret scanning
uses: trufflesecurity/trufflehog@main
uses: trufflesecurity/trufflehog@6c05c4a00b91aa542267d8e32a8254774799d68d # v3.93.8
```
## Step 4: Debugging Methodology
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ jobs:
test:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- uses: actions/checkout@f43a0e5ff2bd294095638e18286ca9a3d1956744 # v3.6.0
- run: npm ci
- run: npm test